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Abstract 
It is argued that without collateral the poor often face binding borrowing constraints in 
the  formal  credit  market.  This  justifies  a  micro-credit  program,  which  is  operated  by  the 
Vietnam  Bank for  Social  Policies  to  provide  the  poor  with  preferential  credit. This  paper 
examines  poverty  targeting  and  impact  of  the  micro-credit  program.  It  is  found  that  the 
program is not very pro-poor in terms of targeting. Among the participants, the non-poor 
account for a larger proportion of loans. The non-poor also tend to receive larger amounts of 
credit compared to the poor. However, the program has positive impact on poverty reduction 
of the participants. This positive impact is found for all the three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
poverty measures.  
Key  words:  Micro-credit,  poverty,  poverty  targeting,  impact  evaluation,  instrumental 
variables, fixed-effect model.  
JEL classification: I32; I38; H43; H81  
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1.  Introduction 
Although Vietnam has experienced remarkable reduction in poverty over the past 10 
years, nearly 20 percent of the population still lives below the poverty line (Table 1). It is 
often argued that micro-credit is an important tool for smoothing consumption and promoting 
production, especially for poor households (e.g. Zeller, et al. 1997; Conning and Udry, 2005). 
However, without collateral the poor can face binding constraints in the credit market. Thus, 
the  Vietnamese government  has  set  up  the  Vietnam  Bank for  Social Policies  (VBSP)  to 
provide the poor with preferential micro-credit since 2003.  
The role of micro-credit in improving household welfare is found in many empirical 
studies.  Micro-credit  programs that  are  assessed  are  implemented  in  several  developing 
countries such as Bangladesh, Pakistan, Thailand, et al. For example, Pitt and Khandker 
(1998) measured the impact of group-based lending programs in Bangladesh, and found 
that the programs had positive and statistically significant impact on household consumption. 
In another paper, Khander (2003) found that micro-finance brings benefits for the poorest, 
thereby  significantly  reducing  poverty  in  Bangladesh.  Significant  impacts  of  credit  on 
expenditure  increases  for  farmers  in  Pakistan  are  also  found  in  Khander  and  Faruqee 
(2003). Burgess and Pande (2002) examined the expansion of bank branches on household 
welfare, and showed that this expansion decreases poverty and inequality. Zaman (2001) 
found  positive  impact  of  micro-credit  provided  by  the  Bangladesh  Rural  Advancement 
Committee on poverty and vulnerability reduction in Bangladesh. Other successful stories of 
the role of micro-credit programs in reducing poverty can be found in a review paper of 
Morduch and Haley (2002). 
However, there are several studies that do not find significant impact of micro-credit on 
welfare improvement and poverty reduction. For example, Diagne and Zeller (2001) did not 
find statistically significant impact of micro-credit on household income in Malawi. Morduch 
(1998)  showed  that  most  potential  impacts  of  micro-credit  from  the  Grameen  bank  in 
Bangladesh were on vulnerability reduction instead of poverty reduction. Coleman (1999) 
found only negligible impact of a micro-credit program in Thailand on household welfare.  
In Vietnam, questions on poverty targeting and impact of the VBSP program remain 
unanswered so far. Most of the evaluation reports simply describe the implementation and 
outputs of the program, such as how many people received credit from the program or how 
much capital was put into the program. The Government has spent a huge amount of money 
to finance the VBSP program. According to VBSP (2005), the total outstanding loans for 
households were 8249 billion VND in 2004.
1 Information on the quantitative assessment of a 
                                                       
1 1 USD = 15 000 VND in 2004  
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program  can  be  of  interest  for  several  reasons.  Firstly,  it  is  very  helpful  in  determining 
whether  the  program  should  be  expanded,  terminated,  or  revised.  A  program  with  bad 
targeting  and  negligible  impact  should  be  considered  for  termination  or  modification. 
Secondly, the assessment can provide useful information for improving the program. For 
example, if it is found that only a small proportion of the poor in urban areas receive credit 
from the program, the program selection should be changed to increase the effectiveness of 
targeting in those areas.  
The main objective of this paper is to examine how well the VBSP program reaches 
the poor, and to what extent the program has an impact in terms of household welfare and 
poverty  reduction.  To  measure  impact  the  paper  employs  two  methods,  including  the 
instrumental variables regression and the fixed-effect panel data with instrumental variables. 
Data used in the analysis are from Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys that were 
conducted in 2002 and 2004. 
The paper is composed of five sections. The first section gives a brief literature review 
of micro-credit program assessments, while the second section introduces the data sources 
and examines the poverty targeting of the VBSP program. The third section presents the 
methodology of impact evaluation. Empirical findings on program impact are presented in 
the  fourth  section,  with  the  fifth  section  discussing  the  conclusion  and  study 
recommendations. 
2.  Poverty Targeting of a VBSP Program 
2.1  Data Sources 
The study relies on data from the two VHLSSs, which were conducted by the General 
Statistical Office of Vietnam (GSO) with technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the 
years 2002 and 2004. The 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs covered 30000 and 9000 households, 
respectively.
2 The selection of the samples follows a method of stratified random cluster 
sampling so that the households are representative at the national, rural and urban, and 
regional levels. It is very interesting that the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs set up a panel of 4000 
households, which are representative of the whole country, and regions of large populations.  
The  surveys  collected  information  through  household  and  community  level 
questionnaires.  Information  on  households  includes  basic  demography,  employment  and 
labor force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and 
durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, and especially 
                                                       
2  In  2002,  GSO  increased  the  sample  size  to  30000  households  so  that  the  data  could  be 
representative for some large provinces. However, this large sample survey was very expensive, and 
the sample size of VHLSS 2004 was reduced to 9000 households.   
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information on loans that households had obtained or still owed during the twelve months 
before the interview.  
Information on commune characteristics was collected from 2960 and 2181 communes 
in the 2002 and 2004 surveys, respectively. Data on commune characteristics consists of 
demography and the general situation of communes, general economic conditions and aid 
programs,  non-farm  employment,  agriculture  production,  local  infrastructure  and 
transportation,  education,  health,  and  social  affairs.  Commune  data  can  be  linked  with 
household  data  to  assess  relationship  between  characteristics  of  households  and 
characteristics of communes in which the households are located. It is unfortunate that the 
commune data in the 2004 VHLSS are only available for rural areas.  
This study focuses on the rural population. The main reason is that several commune 
variables are used in regression analysis of the VBSP impact, and there are only data on 
commune information for rural areas in the 2004 VHLSS. 
2.2  Description of the VBSP Program 
The poor often face shortages of capital and assets. Without collateral they find it more 
difficult to access credit in formal markets. Table 1 compares income, expenditure and main 
assets between the poor and non-poor in Vietnam. It shows that the poor have lower income 
and expenditure per capita than the non-poor. The domestic and foreign remittances are 
very limited for the poor. They also tend to have lower value of fixed and durable assets 
compared to the non-poor. The government of Vietnam was aware of this fact, and had 
conducted  policies  to  provide  the  poor  with  preferential  micro-credit.  Between  1995  and 
2002, the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) was established under the control of the Bank 
for  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  (BARD)  with  the  purpose  of  providing  poor 
households with favorable credit. Since the government has aimed at expanding the credit 
program for the poor, they closed VBSP and launched a new bank called the Vietnam Bank 
for Social Policies (VBSP) beginning 2003. VBSP was independent of BARD and expanded 
its operations rapidly. The branches of VBSP are currently established in all the districts of 
Vietnam.  The  poor  can  borrow  from  a  close  VBSP  branch  at  low  interest  rates  without 
collateral.   
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Table 1: Household characteristics of the poor and non-poor for rural areas in 2004 
Poor  Non-Poor 
Household characteristics 
Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err. 
Income and expenditure (VND thousands)
3         
Income per capita   2226.9  26.8  7100.3  110.6 
Expenditure per capita  1599.7  9.7  5405.0  74.7 
Foreign remittance  62.8  27.0  1386.0  130.2 
Domestic remittance  698.6  41.6  2324.7  88.5 
Household asset         
Value of fixed asset (VND thousands)  7286.0  454.3  31149.0  1572.9 
% households having a motorbike  14.1  0.9  58.8  0.6 
% households having a color television   29.4  1.2  77.8  0.5 
% household having a telephone  0.1  0.1  27.3  0.7 
Housing         
Living areas (m2)  46.6  0.6  62.7  0.5 
% households living in permanent house  4.8  0.6  24.5  0.6 
% households living in semi-permanent house  55.3  1.4  59.6  0.7 
% households living in temporary house  39.9  1.3  15.9  0.5 
Land areas         
Total area of land (m2)  5614.0  1537.3  30462.2  9534.9 
Area of annual crop land (m2)  2512.5  154.6  6397.5  2523.6 
Perennial crop land (m2)  1764.9  718.3  2553.3  442.0 
Forestry land (m2)  1077.2  877.9  20513.7  7306.4 
Area of aquaculture water surface (m2)  259.3  95.8  997.8  249.4 
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2004 
The VBSP program is designed as a group-based lending scheme. In order to borrow 
credit from VBSP, a household has to join a credit group in their locality. A credit group 
should include from 5 to 50 members who are located in the same village. If the number of 
members in a village is lower than 5, they need to join a group in another village. Each credit 
group sets up a management board, which is responsible for borrowing and credit use of its 
members. 
Following are several criteria that a household should meet to become a member of a 
credit group: 
-  The household has a long-term residence permit at the locality  in  which the credit 
group is located;  
-  The household has someone who is able to work (working force); 
-  The household is classified as the poor by commune authority;
4 and  
-  The household has a demand for credit. The credit needs to be used in production, or 
consumption necessary for subsistence.
5 Total loan size is not more than 7 million 
                                                       
3 1 USD = 15 000 VND in 2004 
4 The procedure to classify a household as poor by the local authority is rather complicated. Basically, 
it depends on the income poverty line - which is set by the Ministry of Labor, Invalid, and Social Affairs 
- and other specific criteria set up by each commune.   
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VND. A household can borrow several times, but the total outstanding loans cannot 
be larger than 7 million VND. 
Once a member of a credit group, a household can apply for loans with the VBSP. 
Firstly, they send a letter of intent to their credit group, where the household specifies the 
amount and purpose of the loan that they intend to take. When receiving the application, the 
credit group will arrange a meeting of all members to consider the relevance of the loan. The 
credit group determines which household is able to borrow, as well as the amount and terms 
of each loan. A list of applicants will be prepared by the credit group and sent to the People’s 
Committee in that commune. Once the list is ratified by the People’s Committee, it will be 
sent to a VBSP branch for final approval. Credit processing time is quite fast; it often takes 
from one to four weeks to obtain credit since households send the borrowing request to their 
credit groups. 
It  is  shown  that  VBSP’s  process  of  lending  and  monitoring  credit  is  rather  stringent, 
which is expected to ensure high repayment rates. According to VBSP (2005), the ratio of 
overdue  outstanding  loans  to  the  total  outstanding  loans  is  about  2.96  percent  in  2005. 
Among the overdue loans, the amount of loans that borrowers cannot return accounts for 
59.9  percent.  VBSP  branches  try  to  keep  their  overdue  outstanding  loans,  since  the 
repayment rate can  affect  the  amount  of financing that  a  bank  branch can  receive. The 
VBSP  at  the  national  level  allocates  fewer  funds  to  VBSP  branches  with  overdue 
outstanding loans. On the other hand, credit groups and the People’s Committee are also 
highly responsible for the repayment of credit group members. They tend to exclude very 
poor households who might not be able to repay loans (Dufhues, et al. 2002). Non-poor or 
even better-off households can get loans from VBSP, since they are expected to have higher 
capacity to repay the loans.  
2.3  Poverty Targeting of the VBSP Program 
In this study, a household is classified as poor if their per capita expenditure is below 
the poverty line which is set by WB and GSO Please explain these acronyms. The poverty 
line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allows for nutritional needs and some essential 
non-food consumption such as clothing and housing. This poverty line was first estimated in 
1993. Poverty lines in the following years are estimated by deflating the 1993 poverty line 
using the consumer price index.
6 Figure 1 presents the poverty rates over the period 1993-
2004.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
5  Specifically,  the  loan  can  be  used  for  the  following  activities:  production,  business,  and  service 
provision,  which can generate income in the future; home repair in case of serious damage; and 
educational cost for primary and secondary school pupils. 
6 Regional price differences and monthly price changes over the survey period have been taken into 
account when the poverty lines were calculated.   
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Source: Estimation of VHLSS in 1993, 1998, 2002, and 2004.  
The figure shows that the proportion of people with per capita expenditure under the 
poverty line dropped dramatically from 58.1 percent in 1993 to 37.4 percent in 1998. The 
poverty rate continued to decrease to 28.9 percent and 19.5 percent in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively.
7 However the poverty rate remains rather high in rural areas, at 25 percent in 
2004. The VBSP mainly targets rural areas, since around 95 percent of the poor are located 
in rural areas. As a result, about 87 percent of the VBSP participants in 2004 were rural 
people.  
The poverty targeting of the VBSP program is examined in table 2. The left panel of 
this table investigates how well the program reaches households who are defined as poor by 
the WB-GSO poverty line. It shows that only 12 percent of the poor households in rural 
areas borrowed credit from the VBSP in 2004. This means that the coverage rate of the 
program was relatively low: nearly 88 percent of poor households did not use the favorable 
credit, while the coverage rate for the non-poor was 6.9 percent. The poor tended to receive 
smaller  amounts  of  credit  than  the  middle  income  and  the  rich.  The  loan  size  per  a 
participating poor household was VND 3174.6 thousands, which was lower than the amount 
of VND 3714.8 thousands that a non-poor household borrowed on average. In addition, the 
VBSP  program  had  very  high  leakage  rates.  Among  the  borrowing  households,  poor 
households  accounted  for  only  32.5  percent  of  this  number.  In  other  words,  a  large 
proportion of borrowing households were non-poor.  
                                                       
7 The poor are classified based on the expenditure poverty line constructed by WB-GSO. The poverty 
lines in the years 1993, 1998, 2002, and 2004 are equal to 1160, 1790, 1917, and 2077 thousands 
VND, respectively.  
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The right panel of Table 2 examines how the program targets households who are 
classified as poor by commune authorities. As regulated by the program, only households 
who are classified as poor by commune authorities are eligible for credit borrowing. This 
shows that the coverage of the program is a bit higher, at 17.9 percent. This is because the 
ratio of poor households classified by communes is lower than the ratio of poor households 
classified  by  the  WB-GSO  poverty  line.  However,  the  leakage  rate  is  also  high  for  this 
classification  level.  75.9  percent  of  the  program  participants  were  found  non-poor 
households.  
Table  2:  Percentage  of  borrowing  households,  average  credit  amount  and  interest 
rate,  coverage  and  leakage  rates  of  the  program  for  rural  areas  using  poverty 
classification in 2004 
Poor by WB-GSO  Poor by commune authorities 
Indicators 
Poor  Non-
Poor  Total  Poor  Non-
Poor  Total 
Coverage rate: % borrowing 
households   12.0  6.9  8.0  17.9  6.8  8.0 
  [0.8]  [0.4]  [0.4]  [1.4]  [0.4]  [0.4] 
Amount of borrowed credit 
(thousands VND)  3174.6  3714.8  3537.0  3199.0  3644.1  3537.0 
  [117.8]  [101.1]  [78.2]  [143.2]   [91.4]  [78.2] 
Average of monthly interest 
rate (%)   0.30  0.28  0.29  0.34  0.27  0.29 
  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01]  [0.02]  [0.01]  [0.01] 
Leakage rate: distribution of 
borrowing households (%)  32.9  67.1  100  24.1  75.9  100 
  [2.1]  [2.1]       [1.9]  [1.9]   
Leakage rate: Distribution of 
borrowed credit amount (%)  29.5  70.5  100  21.8  78.2  100 
  [2.1]  [2.1]       [1.9]  [1.9]   
Figures in brackets are standard errors (Standards errors are corrected for sampling weights and 
cluster correlation).  
Note: Number of observations used is 6427, from the 2004 VHLSS.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2004. 
Using  poverty  status  of  households  after  program  implementation  can  result  in 
misleading analysis of the program targeting. Households who received credit can increase 
their income and expenditure and rid themselves of poverty. Thus, table 3 analyses program 
targeting  using  poverty  status  in  2002,  i.e.,  before  the  program.  The  estimates  of  the 
coverage rates of the program do not differ significantly from those in table 2. However, the 
leakage rates are smaller. When the poor were classified using the WB-GSO poverty line, 
they accounted for 45.5 percent of the program participants.   
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Table  3:  Percentage  of  borrowing  households,  average  credit  amount  and  interest 
rate,  coverage  and  leakage  rates  of  the  program  for  rural  areas  using  poverty 
classification in 2002 




Poor  Total  Poor  Non-
Poor  Total 
Coverage rate: % borrowing 
households  13.0  6.4  8.1  17.0  6.8  8.1 
  [1.1]  [0.6]  [0.5]  [1.9]  [0.5]  [0.5] 
Amount of borrowed credit 
(thousands VND)  3151.2  3555.2  3371.3  3045.5  3490.8  3371.3 
  [152.9]  [161.1]  [115.4]  [207.4]  [135.2]  [115.4] 
Average of monthly interest 
rate (%)  0.30  0.31  0.31  0.34  0.29  0.31 
  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.02]  [0.03]  [0.02]  [0.02] 
Leakage rate: distribution of 
borrowing households (%)  45.5  54.5  100  26.8  73.2   100 
  [3.3]  [3.3]    [2.8]  [2.8]   
Leakage rate: Distribution of 
credit amount (%)  42.6  57.4  100  24.2  75.8  100 
  [3.6]  [3.6]    [3.0]  [3.0]   
Figures in brackets are standard errors (Standards errors are corrected for sampling weights and 
cluster correlation).  
Number of households in panel data VHLSS 2002-2004 is 2867.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2002 and VHLSS 2004 
There  are  at  least  two  reasons  why  the  VBSP  program  did  not  reach  the  poor 
households well enough. The first is the difference in poverty definition between the WB-
GSO approach and the approach employed by local commune authorities. In a commune, a 
household is classified as poor if their income is below the income poverty line constructed 
by the Ministry of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs (MOLISA) and they meet several criteria 
such as if they lack food or live in a damaged house. These criteria are set up by each 
commune,  and  they  can  be  very  different  from  one  commune  to  another  (The  poverty 
classification procedures by commune authorities are presented in Box A.1 of Appendix). As 
a  result,  the  poverty  classification  of  commune  authorities  is  not  consistent  across 
communes and over time. Table 4 presents the distribution of population by the poverty 
classification of commune authorities and WB-GSO over the period 2002-2004. It shows that 
13.1 percent of rural people were classified as poor using the commune approach in 2002, 
while this figure was 35.5 percent using the WB-GSO approach. Only 9.8 percent of rural 
people were classified as poor by both approaches. Also in 2002, 25 percent of rural people 
were classified as poor by commune authorities but were considered non-poor according to 
the WB-GSO approach.  
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Table 4: Distribution of rural population using the poverty classification of commune 
authorities and WB-GSO (in percent) 
  The year 2002  The year 2004 
  Poor by commune 
authorities 
Poor by commune 
authorities 
  Poor  Non-
Poor  Total  Poor  Non-
Poor  Total 




























Total  13.1 
[0.4] 
86.9 
[0.4]  100  10.8 
[0.5] 
89.2 
[0.5]  100 
Figures in brackets are standard errors (Standards errors are corrected for sampling weights and 
cluster correlation).  
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2002 and VHLSS 2004 
The second reason why the VBSP program did not effectively reach poor households 
is mentioned in Dufhues, et al. (2002). Credit groups and commune heads are reluctant to 
include poor households in the list of credit applicants. Non-poor can find it easier to obtain 
credit, since they are expected to be more reliable in using credit effectively and repaying 
credit.  
One important issue in examining the effectiveness of credit is the usage of credit. 
Table 5 tabulates loan size by stating the purpose for loans as reported by respondents. A 
large proportion of credit was used in production and investment. The poor used about 62.5 
percent of the VBSO credit amount for production capital and capital investment, while this 
proportion for the non-poor was at 58.9 percent. Credit was also used for dept repayment. 
However, the poor and non-poor also used 29.2 percent and 33.7 percent, respectively of 
the credit amount for consumption.  
Table 5: Distribution of credit amount by credit usage and poverty status for rural 
areas in 2004 
  Poor  Non-Poor  Total 
Production capital  41.6  51.9  48.9 
  [4.0]  [2.9]  [2.4] 
Capital investment   20.9  7.0  11.1 
  [3.3]  [1.3]  [1.5] 
Dept repayment  8.3  7.4  7.7 
  [2.3]  [1.6]  [1.3] 
Consumption  29.2  33.7  32.3 
  [3.8]  [2.7]  [2.2] 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Figures in brackets are standard errors (Standards errors are corrected for sampling weights and 
cluster correlation). 
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2004  
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3.  Methodology to Impact Evaluation 
3.1  Parameters of interest  
The main objective of program impact evaluation is to assess the extent to which the 
program has changed outcomes of subjects.
8 Suppose that there is a program assigned to 
some people in population P, and denote 
b D  as a binary variable of participation in the 
program of a person, i.e., 
b D  equals 1 if she/he participates in the program, and D
b equals 0 
otherwise. Further, let Y denote the observed value of the outcome of interest. This variable 
can receive two potential values corresponding to the values of the participation variable, 
i.e.,  1 Y Y =  if  1 =
b D , and  0 Y Y =  otherwise.
9 Then the program impact on a person i is 
defined as: 
0 1 i i i Y Y − = ∆ .                        (1) 
The  most  popular  parameter  of  the  program  impact  is  Average  Treatment  Effect  on  the 
Treated (ATT) (Heckman, et al., 1999), which is the expected impact of the program on the 
actual participants:
10  
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 0 1 0 1 ) 1 , 0 ( = − = = = − = = ∆ =
b b b b D Y E D Y E D Y Y E D E ATT .
11    (2) 
Since the size of loans taken by a household can be regarded a continuous variable, 
one can be interested in additional impacts of a program when the size of loans changes by 
an amount, denoted byδ . Denote 
c D as a continuous variable indicating the size of loans 
that a household borrows. For simplicity, denote  ) D ( Y
c
i  as potential outcome of person i 
corresponding to the value of variable
c D . We can measure the change in program impact 
due a change in the amount of credit from d  to  δ + d : 








i = − + = = = − + = δ ∆ δ ∆ .       (3) 
Since we cannot estimate (5) for each person, we are interested in its average: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] ) d D ( Y E ) d D ( Y E ) d D ( ) d D ( E
c c c c = − + = = = − + = δ ∆ δ ∆ .     (4) 
Expectation in (6) can be written for those who participate in the program: 
[ ] [ ] 0 0 > = − + = = > = − + =
c c c c c c D ) d D ( Y ) d D ( Y E D ) d D ( ) d D ( E δ ∆ δ ∆ .    (5) 
                                                       
8 In the literature of impact evaluation, a broader term “treatment” instead of program/project impact is 
sometimes used to refer to an intervention whose impact is evaluated. 
9 Y can be a vector of outcomes, but for simplicity let us consider a single outcome of interest.  
10 There are other parameters such as average treatment effect (ATE), local average treatment effect, 
marginal  treatment  effect,  or  even  effect  of  “non-treatment  on  non-treated”  which  measures  what 
impact the program would have on the non-participants if they had participated in the program, etc.  
11 In some formulas, the subscript i is dropped for simplicity.   
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We can divide the right-hand side of (7) by δ  to obtain a parameter called the average 
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This parameter measures how the average program impact on the treated changes 
due to a small change in the amount of credit. 
If we consider  [ ] 0 >
c c D , X ) D ( Y E  as a real function of 
c D , and denote this function by 
) (
c
o D D f c> , the impact parameter can be represented by the derivative of  ) (
c
o D D f c>  with 
respect to 
c D . 
3.2  Impact evaluation methods 
The main problem in measuring impact of a micro-credit program is endogeneity of 
program  participation.  The  borrowing  of  credit  can  be  correlated  with  unobserved 
characteristics of households such as motivation for higher income or abilities in business. 
By failing to control for unobservable factors affecting program participation, the program 
impact estimation is no longer unbiased. Most of the studies on impact evaluation of micro-
credit  programs  are  aware  of  the  endogeneity  problem  of  program  participation.  Since 
experimental  designs  are  difficult  to  be  implemented  for  micro-credit  programs,  quasi-
experimental and non-experimental designs are often used in impact evaluation. Examples 
of  evaluation  of  micro-credit  based quasi-experiments  are  Coleman  (1999),  and  Pitt  and 
Khandker  (1998).  Popular  methods  in  non-experimental  designs  include  instrumental 
variables (Khander and Faruqee, 2003; Burgess and Pande, 2002), sample selection (e.g., 
Zaman,  2001),  and  models  based  on  panel  data  (e.g.,  Khander,  2003;  Nguyen  and 
Westbrook, 2006). 
To measure program impact on household welfare, the paper assumes welfare can be 
specified as follows: 
i i i i D X Y ε γ β α + + + = ) ln( ,                 (7) 
where Y is per capita expenditure or per capita income, X is a vector of household and 
regional characteristics, and D is the program variable. The program impact is measured by 
parameter γ .  
                                                       
12 This can be called the marginal treatment effect on the treated. However, in some papers, e.g., 
Heckman  and  Vytlacil  (2005),  marginal  treatment  effect  is  defined  as  the  treatment  effect  on  the 




It should be noted that when we are interested in the impact of participation in the 
program regardless of the size of the program, we can use D as a binary variable. When we 
are interested in the impact of additional credit amount on the participant, D is the loan size, 
which is a continuous variable.  
In the case of credit programs, the main problem in getting the unbiased estimator of 
γ  is the correlation between the variables D and ε  in equation (7). For the VBSP program, 
there can be unobserved variables such as business and production skills of households 
and  the  prevailing  business  environment,  which  would  affect  both  the  outcomes  and 
program participation. As a result, the problem of endogeneity can happen, and methods 
that do not deal with this problem can lead to biased estimates of the program impact.  
This study uses two methods to estimate program impact.
13 The first method is the 
instrumental  variables  (IV)  regressions.  This  method  requires  at  least  one  instrumental 
variable Z, which must be correlated with the D variable but not correlated with the error tem, 
ε , given the X variables. If instruments are found, all the coefficients in (7) can be identified 
and  estimated  consistently  using  different  estimators  such  as  parametric  two-stage  least 
squares (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM), and limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML).
14  
The second method is the fixed-effect with IV regression using panel data from VHLSS 
2002-2004. Using fixed-effect transformation, we can remove unobserved variables that are 
time-invariants.  Then,  the  IV  regressions  are  applied  to  solve  the  problem  of  correlation 
between the D variable and the remaining time-variant error terms.  
4.  Impact Measurement to a VBSP program 
4.1  Impact of the VBSP Program on Household’s Expenditure and Income 
This section presents empirical findings of the VBSP program’s impact. The first step is 
to select the outcome and conditioning variables. A household is expected to use credit in 
production or consumption. If the credit is used effectively, their income and consumption 
expenditure  per  capita  will  increase. We  measure  the  program’s  impact  on  consumption 
expenditure per capita and income per capita. One reason for using expenditure per capita 
as an outcome is that expenditure is a popular welfare indicator with which we can measure 
impact of VBSP on poverty reduction. 
                                                       
13  We  do  not  use  parametric  sample  selection  models,  since  it  requires  assumption  on  the  joint 
distribution  of  errors  in  the  outcome  and  treatment  equations.  Although  there  are  several 
nonparametric estimators in sample selection methods, it is difficult to write software programs to 
implement the estimation.  
14 Examples of instrumental variables as well as a detailed discussion of instrument variable methods 
can be seen in econometrics textbooks (Wooldridge, 2001 and Greene, 2003), papers   (Baum et. al., 
2003, and Staiger and Stock, 1997), or literature on the review of impact evaluation (Moffitt, 1991).  
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Total expenditure per capita is collected using very detailed questionnaires in VHLSS. 
Total  expenditure  includes  food  and  non-food  expenditure.  Food  expenditure  includes 
purchased food, foodstuff, and self-produced products of households. Non-food expenditure 
comprises  expenditure on  education,  healthcare,  houses  and  commodities,  power,  water 
supply, and garbage collection? 
Total income figures per capita are also collected carefully. Household income can 
come from any source. Total income includes income from agricultural and non-agricultural 
production, salary, wage, pension, scholarship, income from loan interest and house rental, 
remittances,  and  subsidies.  Income  from  agricultural  production  comprises  crop  income, 
livestock income, aquaculture income, and income from other agriculture-related activities.  
There  can  be  a  large  number  of  explanatory  variables  in  outcome  equations.  The 
household  variables  include  demography,  household  assets,  housing,  education, 
employment, and health status. The commune and village variables include infrastructure 
and socioeconomic characteristics. The explanatory variables should not be affected by the 
program. It should be noted that data on communes and villages are collected only for rural 
areas. Summary statistics of explanatory variables in the 2004 VHLSS are presented in table 
A.1 in Appendix. 
The  first  method  used  to  measure  program  impact  is  instrumental  variables  using 
single cross section data from the 2004 VHLSS. The key identification issue is to find a valid 
instrument for  program participation,  i.e.  credit borrowing.  Such  an  instrument  should  be 
correlated with the program participant and excluded from the outcome equation. In this 
study, two instrumental variables are employed. The first one is the commune poverty rate 
which  is  based  on  the  poverty  classification  of  commune  authorities.  It  is  obvious  that 
households’ participation is correlated with criteria of program selection. One of the selection 
criteria is the poverty status classified by the commune authorities. A commune which has a 
large number of poor households will have a large number of potential participants in the 
program. However, when there are many applicants for credit borrowing, credit groups and 
commune  heads  tend  to  screen  the  applicant  list  more  carefully,  since  they  also  have 
responsibility  in  ensuring  the  repayment  rate  of  the  borrowers.  More  applicants  can  be 
excluded from the borrowing list. As a result, an eligible household who lives in a commune 
with a large number of poor households will face higher competition when borrowing from 
the program.  
The second instrumental variable is the distance from a village (where households are 
located) to the nearest bank. The 2004 VHLSS collected just information on the distance 
from a village to a branch bank. There is no information on whether the closest branch bank  
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is a VBSP one. Although the nearest bank can be any commercial bank instead of a VBSP 
branch, the VBSP bank can be located close to the nearest bank. Households in a village 
which is closer to a VBSP branch bank are more likely to obtain credit from the bank.  
The condition of correlation between the instrumental variables and credit borrowing 
can be investigated by running a regression of borrowing on the instrumental variables and 
other explanatory variables. Table A.2 in Appendix reports results of selected regressions. 
The second and third columns show regressions of program participation and size of VBSP 
loans. Variable “commune poverty rate” and “distance to the nearest bank” are statistically 
correlated with the participation of households in the VBSP program. As expected, both the 
instrumental  variables  are  statistically  significant  and  negatively  correlated  with  program 
participation. Living in an area with many eligible households or far from banks reduces the 
chance  of  program  participation.  Although  the  instrumental  variables  can  be  statically 
significant in the regressions on the endogenous variables, i.e., the program participation 
and  the  credit  size,  they  can  be  weakly  correlated  with  the  endogenous  variables.  The 
problem of weak identification causes the traditional two-stage least square estimator to not 
function properly, which leads to unreliability of the statistical inference about the estimates 
(Stock and Yogo, 2005). In the study, this test is based on the Cragg-Donald statistic (Cragg 
and Donald, 1993). The test statistic in per capita expenditure and income equations is equal 
to 24.74 and 29.99, respectively (Table A.3 in Appendix). As a rule of thumb, if a test is over 
10,  the  instruments  would  not  be  weak  (Staige  and  Stock,  1997).  However,  to  examine 
whether the impact estimates are sensitive to different instrumental variable estimators, the 
study uses three types of parametric estimators, including two-stage least squares (2SLS), 
generalized method of moments (GMM), and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML).  
The condition of un-correlation between the instrumental variables and the error term 
in outcome equations cannot be tested, since the error term is unobserved. In this study, 
there are at least two reasons for the absence of the commune poverty rate and distance to 
the nearest bank in the outcome equation. Firstly, commune and village variables that are 
most important in determining households’ welfare are often a function of infrastructures and 
geographic characteristics. Infrastructure variables can include road, market and school, etc. 
Geographic variables can be dummy regional variables, geographic types of locality, and 
distance to the nearest town, etc. Provided these variables are controlled for in the outcome 
equation, the instrumental variables would be uncorrelated with the unobserved variables in 
this outcome equation. Secondly, empirical findings show that communes and villages do 
not play an important role in households’ welfare once household variables are controlled 
for. Table A.2 in Appendix shows that only a few variables of villages and communes are 
statistically significant in outcome regressions.   
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Using the two instruments, we can then perform an over-identification test. Table A.3 in 
Appendix presents the Sargan-Hansen tests for estimators of 2SLS and LIML. Based on this 
test statistic, we cannot reject the hypothesis on over-identification of instrumental variables. 
In addition, the endogeneity of program participation and loan size can be tested using the 
instruments.  Results  from  Durbin-Wu-Hausman  tests  show  that  the  hypothesis  on  the 
exogeneity of program participation and loan size from the program is strongly rejected.  
The second method is fixed-effect with IV regression using panel data from VHLSS 
2002-2004.  In  this  method,  there  is  only  one  instrument,  which  is  the  poverty  rate  of 
communes. This is because the 2002 VHLSS did not collect information on the distance 
from villages to the nearest bank.  
Table 6 present the results of impact evaluation for rural areas using the instrumental 
variable method. In this table, only the estimates of coefficients of program participation and 
the amount of borrowed credit from instrumental variables regression are presented.
15 The 
left panel of the table presents estimates from IV the regressions using single-cross section 
data of the 2004 VHLSS, while the right panel reports estimates from the fixed-effect with IV 
regressions using panel data from the 2002 and 2004 VHLSSs. It shows that the estimates 
of the coefficient of the loan size are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent and 
5 percent levels for log of expenditure per capita and log of income per capita. Program 
participation also has positive and statistically significant coefficients. The estimates do not 
differ significantly across various IV estimators.  
The  estimates  from  the  fixed-effect  with  IV  methods  are  also  positive,  and  are 
statistically  significant  at  the  1  percent  level.  Thus,  compared  to  the  IV  regressions,  the 
estimates from the fixed-effect with IV ones have small standard errors.  
                                                       
15 Some of regression results using 2SLS estimators are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
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Table 6: Program impact on expenditure and income per capita 
IV regression  Fixed-effect with IV regression  Program 
variable 
IV 
estimators  Log of expenditure 
per capita 
Log of income 
per capita 
Log of expenditure 
per capita 
Log of income 
per capita 
2SLS  0.00019***  0.00017**  0.00021***  0.00029*** 
  [0.00007]  [0.00008]  [0.00004]  [0.00006] 
GMM  0.00018***  0.00017**     
  [0.00007]  [0.00008]     




  [0.00007]  [0.00008]     
2SLS  0.68611***  0.62768**  0.70177***  0.96788*** 
  [0.25375]  [0.27715]  [0.13829]  [0.17866] 
GMM  0.68572***  0.62714**     
  [0.25249]  [0.27705]     





  [0.25376]  [0.27719]     
Number of observations in 
regression  6427  6427  5552  5552 
Figures in brackets are standard errors (Standards errors are corrected for sampling weights and 
cluster correlation).  
5552 is the total number of observations in the panel data of VHLSS 2002-2004. The number of 
households in the panel data is 2772. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2002 and VHLSS 2004 
The  difference  in  impact  between  the  poor  and  non-poor  participants  is  tested  by 
adding  the  interaction  between  the  poverty  status  and  the  program  variables  to  the  IV 
regression. We use the poverty status in 2002, since it is not affected by the program. It is 
found  that  all  the  estimates  of  the  interaction  coefficients  are  not  statistically  significant 
(Table A.4 in Appendix). It suggests that the difference in program impact between the poor 
and non-poor households is not statistically significant. 
4.2  Impact of the VBSP Program on Poverty 
Since the VBSP program has a positive impact on the consumption expenditure per 
capita, it is expected that the program can also reduce poverty. This study measures poverty 
by  three  Foster-Greer-Thorbecke  poverty  indexes  which  can  all  be  calculated  using  the 


















α ,                      (8) 
where yi is a welfare indicator (consumption expenditure per capita in this paper) for 
person i, z is the poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, q is the 
number of poor people, and α can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion.  
When α = 0, we have the headcount index H which measures the proportion of people 
below the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we have the poverty gap PG which measures  
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the  depth  of  poverty,  and  the  squared  poverty  gap  P2  which  measures  the  severity  of 
poverty, respectively. 
Impact of the program on poverty of the participants is given by: 
) Y , D ( P ) Y , D ( P P 0 1 1 1 = − = = α α α ∆ ,                     (9) 
where  the  first  term  in  the  left-hand  side  of  (9)  is  the  measure  of  poverty  in  the 
presence of the VBSP program. This term is observed and can be estimated directly from 
the sample data. However, the second term in the left-hand side of (9) is the counterfactual 
measure of poverty, i.e., poverty indexes of the credit recipients if they had not received the 
credit. This term is not observed directly, and it is estimated using predicted expenditure in 
the absence of the micro-credit program. Since the use of instrumental variables produces 
statistically significant results, it is also utilized to estimate counterfactual expenditure. Recall 
the outcome equation as follows: 
i i i i D X Y ε γ β α + + + = ) ln(                     (10) 
Counterfactual expenditure in the absence of the program for a participant is: 
( ) β α ˆ ˆ exp ˆ
0 i i X Y + = ,                      (11) 
However, we do not use this counterfactual expenditure to estimate the poverty indices 
directly. Using the counterfactual expenditure to estimate poverty for each households and 
then adding these up will lead to biased estimators of poverty indices (Hentschel, et al., 
2000). Instead, we employ the idea of “small area estimation” by Elbers, et al. (2003). Firstly, 
we estimate equation (10) using the instrumental variables regression. Then, for household i, 
denote  Pi  as  the  indicator  of  poverty  for  the  household.  Pi  is  equal  to  1  if  per  capita 
expenditure  of  the  household  is  below  the  poverty  line,  and  equal  to  0  otherwise.  The 
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P ,                (12) 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal function; α ˆ  and β ˆ  are estimators of α and 
β , respectively; σ ˆ  is the estimator of the standard deviation of error term ε  in the outcome 
equation,  0 i Y ˆ  is predicted expenditure per capita of household i in the absence of the VBSP 
credit.   
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Poverty rate for the group of the participants is simply the sum of expected poverty of 










) Y , D ( P ˆ
1
0 0 1 ,                     (13) 
where mi is the size of household i; M is the total population of the participating group; 
and N is the number of households in the participating group.  
To estimate the poverty gap index PG, and the poverty severity index P2, we employ a 
method  proposed  by  Minot,  et  al.  (2003)  to  estimate  the  cumulative  distribution  of  the 
expenditure per capita in the absence of the VBSP credit by changing the poverty line from 
the lowest expenditure per capita to the highest expenditure per capita in the sample. The 
estimated cumulative distribution is then used to estimate the poverty indexes PG and P2 (in 
the state of no-credit from the program). To estimate standard error of estimates, the paper 
uses a nonparametric bootstrap technique with 200 replications.  
Table 7: Program impact on poverty indices 
Poverty indices & IV estimators  
Actual  No-credit 
counterfactual 
Difference 
2SLS       
Headcount ratio  0.3633***  0.4145***  -0.0512* 
  [0.0234]  [0.0238]  [0.0270] 
Poverty gap index  0.0898***  0.1222***  -0.0324** 
  [0.0077]  [0.0142]  [0.0134] 
Poverty severity index  0.0319***  0.0487***  -0.0168** 
  [0.0035]  [0.0082]  [0.0078] 
GMM       
Headcount ratio  0.3633***  0.4098***  -0.0465 
  [0.0234]  [0.0232]  [0.0295] 
Poverty gap index  0.0898***  0.1192***  -0.0294** 
  [0.0077]  [0.0135]  [0.0139] 
Poverty severity index  0.0319***  0.0470***  -0.0151** 
  [0.0035]  [0.0078]  [0.0077] 
LIML       
Headcount ratio  0.3633***  0.4128***  -0.0496* 
  [0.0234]  [0.0245]  [0.0297] 
Poverty gap index  0.0898***  0.1219***  -0.0321** 
  [0.0077]  [0.0152]  [0.0159] 
Poverty severity index  0.0319***  0.0487***  -0.0168* 
  [0.0035]  [0.0090]  [0.0092] 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
Figures in brackets are standard errors.  
Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap (non-parametric) with 200 replications and are 
corrected for sampling weights.  
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2004 
Table 7 presents an estimation of the VBSP’s impact on poverty of the participants. 
The IV regressions are used to predict the expenditure per capita without the program, and  
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the program variable is the size of loans. The IV estimators include 2SLS, GMM, and LIML. 
The three estimators yield rather similar results of estimation of the program’s impact on 
poverty. For example, based on the 2SLS estimator, the impact on reduction in poverty rate 
is estimated at 5.1 percent with a significance level of 10 percent. In other words, the VBSP 
program  helps  the  participants  reduce  the  poverty  rate  by  5.1  percentage  points.  The 
program also reduces the poverty gap index of the participants by 0.032 with a statistical 
significance level of 5 percent. The poverty severity index is also reduced by 0.017 due to 
credit from the program, while the statistical significance level of this estimate is 5 percent.  
5  Conclusions 
The paper examines the VBSP’s poverty targeting and the impact of its preferential 
credit program for the poor. The program is designed to provide the poor households with 
credit  at  low  interest  rates  without  collateral.  However,  the  program’s  targeting  methods 
leave much to be desired: only 12 percent of the poor households in rural areas participated 
in  the  program  in  2004.  Meanwhile,  the  program  covered  6.4  percent  of  the  non-poor 
households. The non-poor households accounted for 67.1 percent of the beneficiaries. The 
poor households also received smaller amounts of credit than the non-poor. Thus, in terms 
of targeting, the program is not very pro-poor. Although, the poor access the program more 
proportionally  than  the  non-poor,  they  account  for  a  smaller  proportion  of  the  program 
participants.
16. One of the main reasons for such ineffective targeting can be explained in 
Dufhues, et al. (2002). Heads of credit groups and communes are reluctant to verify the poor 
households  in  the  list  of  credit  applicants  because  of  their  low  repayment  capacity.  The 
Government and VBSP should therefore employ measures to reduce the lending program’s 
leakage rate and increase its coverage rate at the same time, while keeping the program 
effective.  Further  studies  on  the  lending  system  and  the  selection  process  should  be 
conducted in order to generate more detailed suggestions for the modification. 
Empirical  results  from  impact  evaluation  show  that  the  program  has  positive  and 
statistically significant impact on consumption expenditure per capita and income per capita 
of the participating households. Since the program has a positive impact on households’ 
expenditure, it is expected that the program can contribute to poverty reduction. It is found 
that the program has positive and statistically significant effects on reduction of the poverty 
rate, poverty gap and poverty severity. 
                                                       
16 The poor access “more proportionally” than the non-poor, i.e., the program coverage for the poor is 
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Box A.1: Procedure on Poverty Classification for Commune Authorities 
Although the idea of poverty classification is to compare household income with the poverty line, 
the practical procedure of classifying the poor households of MOLISA is rather complicated. One 
reason for this is that one cannot collect reliable data on income for all households in the country. 
Accurate collection of income data is very costly. As a result, MOLISA is only able to collect 
income data for those who are considered as poor and near poor by the commune authorities. 
They rely on the administrative system at the local level in identifying the poor households. The 
poverty classification can be described by the following stages:  
Stage 1: Preparing a preliminary list of poor households at the village level. 
Each  village  sets  up  a  committee  which  includes  the  village  head  and  members  of  social 
organizations, which then prepares a preliminary list of poor households in the village. Usually, 
the committee starts with the list of the poor households in the previous (current) period, and 
considers  which  households  should  be  excluded  from  the  list,  as  well  as  which  households 
should  be  added  to  the  preliminary  list.  The  committee  puts  forward  several  criteria  for  this 
exclusion and inclusion of households. These criteria can be very different from one village to 
another.  
Once the preliminary list of poor households is finalized, it will be submitted to a committee of 
Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) also within the commune. 
Stage 2: Justifying the list of poor households at the commune level.  
The  HEPR  committee  collects  the  lists  of  poor  households  from  all  villages.  They  conduct  a 
survey on income for all households in the preliminary list. Those who have income per capita 
higher than the MOLISA income poverty line will be excluded from the list. At the end of this 
stage, a refined list of the poor is constructed.  
Stage 3: Conducting village meetings to verify the refined list of poor households. 
The HEPR committee sends the new list of poor households to each village in the commune. 
Each  village  then  organizes  meetings  for  all  people  in  the  village  to  discuss  the  list  of  poor 
households. The list can be revised and then sent back to the HEPR committee.  
Stage 4: Finalizing the list of poor households at the commune level. 
The HEPR committee submits the revised list of poor households to the People Committee and 
People Council to finalize the list of the poor households. The list can still be changed at this 
stage. The commune authorities can adjust the number of poor households in the list. If so, the 
HEPR committee has to repeat Stages 1 to 3 to determine who should be excluded or added to 
the list of poor households.  
Stage 5: Providing certificates to the poor households.  
Each  commune  sends  the  list  of  the  poor  households  to  the  district  authorities.  The  district 
collects the lists from all communes, and prepares the district list of the poor households. Then, 
this list is sent to the Department of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs (DOLISA) of the province. 
DOLISA finalizes the list, and prepares the poor household certificates for all the households in 
the list. Finally, these certificates are sent to the poor households. 
Once the list of poor households is finalized, poverty rates of small areas such as communes or 
even villages can be easily estimated by counting the number of poor households and dividing 
this number by the total number of households.   
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Table A.1; Description of variables in regressions 
Participants  Non-Participants 
Explanatory variables  Variable type 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
VARIABLES FROM HOUSEHOLD DATA           
Age of household head  Discrete  46.4  11.6  48.6  13.6 
Gender of household head  Binary  0.8386  0.3682  0.8313  0.3745 
Head are ethnic minorities  Binary  0.3025  0.4597  0.1474  0.3545 
Completed education degree of head           
Without education degree  Binary  0.2964  0.4571  0.3183  0.4658 
Primary school degree  Binary  0.2816  0.4502  0.2546  0.4357 
Lower-secondary school  Binary  0.2918  0.4550  0.2705  0.4443 
Upper secondary school  Binary  0.0427  0.2023  0.0626  0.2422 
Technical degree  Binary  0.0813  0.2735  0.0770  0.2666 
Post-secondary school  Binary  0.0061  0.0781  0.0170  0.1293 
Ratio of hh. members younger than 16  Continuous  0.3048  0.2096  0.2776  0.2081 
Ratio of hh. members older than 60  Continuous  0.0549  0.1325  0.0972  0.1964 
Ratio of female hh. members  Continuous  0.4720  0.1646  0.5046  0.1757 
Household size  Discrete  5.1796  2.0295  5.0342  1.7925 
Ratio of members with lower secondary 
school  Continuous  0.2195  0.2457  0.2132  0.2368 
Ratio of members with upper secondary 
school  Continuous  0.0541  0.1140  0.0701  0.1379 
Ratio of members with technical degree  Continuous  0.0401  0.1221  0.0421  0.1175 
Ratio of members with post secondary 
school  Continuous  0.0055  0.0445  0.0145  0.0714 
Number of day-off due to sickness per HH 
member  Continuous  5.0137  10.9696  4.9532  12.1650 
Ratio of hh. members working in agriculture  Continuous  0.7057  0.3585  0.6253  0.3948 
Ratio of hh. members working in service  Continuous  0.1402  0.2649  0.1856  0.3131 
Ratio of hh. members working in industry  Continuous  0.1446  0.2611  0.1577  0.2795 
Being classified as poor hh. by commune 
authority  Binary  0.2379  0.4262  0.0957  0.2942 
Land variables           
Area of annual crop land (m2)  Continuous  4204.9  5512.5  4305.2  7585.1 
Area of perennial crop land (m2)  Continuous  1059.0  5485.1  1283.9  7572.6 
Area of aquaculture water surface (m2)  Continuous  127.3  912.2  408.7  3021.2 
Domestic remittance (thousand VND)  Continuous  918.1  2098.8  1651.0  4013.0 
Foreign remittance (thousand VND)  Continuous  247.4  2115.9  742.1  6068.9 
Pension (thousand VND)  Continuous  370.1  1557.3  597.6  2488.4 
VARIABLES FROM COMMUNE DATA           
Commune variables           
Poverty ratio by commune authority 
(also instrumental variable)  Continuous  0.1086  0.0822  0.0977  0.0855 
Geographic variables           
Costal areas  Binary  0.0427  0.2024  0.0737  0.2612 
Delta  Binary  0.4337  0.4960  0.5778  0.4940 
Midland/hilly land  Binary  0.0645  0.2458  0.0671  0.2501 
Low mountainous areas  Binary  0.2279  0.4199  0.1394  0.3464 
High mountainous areas  Binary  0.2312  0.4220  0.1421  0.3492 
Region variables           
Red River Delta  Binary  0.1934  0.3953  0.2472  0.4314 
North East  Binary  0.2276  0.4197  0.1003  0.3004 
North West  Binary  0.0806  0.2725  0.0370  0.1889 
North Central Coast  Binary  0.1682  0.3744  0.1394  0.3464 
South Central Coast  Binary  0.1043  0.3059  0.0859  0.2802  
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Participants  Non-Participants 
Explanatory variables  Variable type 
Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Central Highlands  Binary  0.0487  0.2155  0.0573  0.2325 
North East South  Binary  0.0501  0.2184  0.0985  0.2980 
Mekong River Delta  Binary  0.1269  0.3332  0.2344  0.4236 
Have post-office  Binary  0.8736  0.3326  0.8282  0.3773 
Have inter-communal market  Binary  0.6043  0.4894  0.6473  0.4778 
Have non-farm enterprises  Binary  0.4895  0.5003  0.5538  0.4971 
Have irrigation plant  Binary  0.7151  0.4518  0.6645  0.4722 
Distance to nearest agr. extension center 
(km)  Continuous  10.451  10.507  10.563  9.872 
Have national electricity network  Binary  0.9492  0.2198  0.9669  0.1790 
Have primary school  Binary  0.9987  0.0355  0.9972  0.0524 
Have lower secondary school  Binary  0.9331  0.2500  0.9462  0.2256 
Have upper secondary school  Binary  0.1265  0.3327  0.1488  0.3559 
Poverty alleviation in the communes           
Employment generation  Binary  0.2235  0.4170  0.2684  0.4432 
Poverty reduction  Binary  0.5755  0.4947  0.5494  0.4976 
Socioeconomic development and 
infrastructure  Binary  0.6071  0.4888  0.5901  0.4918 
Education and culture  Binary  0.3048  0.4607  0.2922  0.4548 
Public Health  Binary  0.2014  0.4014  0.1540  0.3609 
Environment and clean water  Binary  0.1647  0.3713  0.1438  0.3510 
Have the program 135 that supports 
communes with difficulties  Binary  1.7559  0.4352  1.8127  0.3936 
Village variables           
Have car road  Binary  0.8594  0.3480  0.8737  0.3322 
Distance to nearest town (km)  Continuous  10.586  9.843  9.961  9.633 
Distance to Commune People Committee 
(km)  Continuous  1.5476  2.0427  1.4527  2.0831 
Distance to nearest daily market (km)  Continuous  4.7661  9.7936  3.0449  6.1988 
Distance to nearest periodic market (km)  Continuous  3.0275  5.4298  2.2217  4.9126 
Distance to nearest whole-sale market (km)  Continuous  6.3901  11.1145  6.3536  11.8301 
Distance to nearest primary school (km)  Continuous  0.7862  1.1934  0.6652  1.0765 
Distance to nearest lower secondary school 
(km)  Continuous  1.606  2.249  1.516  2.187 
Distance to nearest upper secondary school 
(km)  Continuous  4.631  7.738  3.929  6.188 
Distance to nearest regional health polyclinic 
(km)  Continuous  7.880  13.472  7.859  14.403 
Distance to nearest district hospital (km)  Continuous  11.194  9.688  10.640  10.089 
Distance to nearest other hospital (km)  Continuous  51.490  83.068  45.581  74.116 
Distance to nearest bank (km)  Continuous  6.504  7.530  6.623  7.520 
Number of observations      549    5878 




Table A.2: Results on OLS and 2SLS regressions of expenditure and income per capita 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND REGRESSION MODELS 
First-stage regression  2SLS regression using VHLSS 2004 data  Fixed-effect with IV-2SLS regression using panel data 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  Participation 
in the program 
(Logit) 

































Household variables                     
Size of the VBSP loans      0.00019***    0.00017**    0.00021***    0.00029***   
      [0.00007]    [0.00008]    [0.00004]    [0.00006]   
Participation in the VBSP program        0.68611***    0.62768**    0.70177***    0.96788*** 
        [0.25375]    [0.27715]    [0.13829]    [0.17866] 
Age of household head  0.00951  3.3910**  0.00024  0.00042  -0.0011  -0.00093  0.00172  0.00211  0.00104  0.00158 
  [0.00610]  [1.6201]  [0.00077]  [0.00074]  [0.00088]  [0.00084]  [0.00133]  [0.00128]  [0.00173]  [0.00166] 
Gender of household head  -0.20629  -52.395  0.02129  0.02077  0.05523***  0.05479***  -0.0589  -0.04874  -0.01301  0.00102 
  [0.16553]  [44.220]  [0.01682]  [0.01656]  [0.01948]  [0.01918]  [0.04137]  [0.03987]  [0.05387]  [0.05151] 
Head are ethnic minorities  0.46009**  201.816**  -0.2292***  -0.2226***  -0.2144***  -0.2085***  -0.06507  -0.03533  -0.17266**  -0.13165 
  [0.20674]  [80.053]  [0.03030]  [0.02872]  [0.03242]  [0.03076]  [0.06689]  [0.06328]  [0.08710]  [0.08175] 
Head without education degree  Omitted                   
                     
Head with primary school degree  0.21616  100.707**  0.05858***  0.06485***  0.04610**  0.05178***  0.08051***  0.07863***  0.08857***  0.08598*** 
  [0.14518]  [39.289]  [0.01750]  [0.01658]  [0.02007]  [0.01902]  [0.02389]  [0.02306]  [0.03111]  [0.02979] 
Head with lower-secondary school  0.18855  94.777*  0.07159***  0.07893***  0.06453**  0.07120***  0.05048  0.0522  0.05353  0.0559 
  [0.20823]  [56.443]  [0.02336]  [0.02274]  [0.02709]  [0.02617]  [0.03539]  [0.03422]  [0.04609]  [0.04421] 
Head with upper secondary school  0.06862  78.512  0.01621  0.02514  0.0324  0.04053  -0.01494  -0.02493  0.1128  0.09903 
  [0.33266]  [74.836]  [0.03217]  [0.03192]  [0.03652]  [0.03641]  [0.05273]  [0.05090]  [0.06867]  [0.06576] 
Head with technical degree  0.25615  134.53  0.05418  0.06447*  0.06126  0.07060*  0.01305  0.02872  0.03344  0.05505 
  [0.29403]  [87.460]  [0.03740]  [0.03601]  [0.04309]  [0.04186]  [0.05457]  [0.05255]  [0.07107]  [0.06789] 
Head with post-secondary school  0.02227  70.020  -0.04097  -0.03193  0.07073  0.07895  0.04389  0.04421  0.12076  0.12119 
  [0.75258]  [120.820]  [0.05442]  [0.05263]  [0.05818]  [0.05636]  [0.10573]  [0.10225]  [0.13769]  [0.13211] 
Ratio of hh. members younger than 
16  -0.23796  4.98109  -0.3050***  -0.2934***  -0.3926***  -0.3821***  -0.2659***  -0.2251***  -0.3490***  -0.2927*** 
  [0.36338]  [97.206]  [0.03891]  [0.03895]  [0.04515]  [0.04496]  [0.06891]  [0.06790]  [0.08973]  [0.08773] 
Ratio of hh. members older than 16  -2.2536***  -511.629***  -0.06528  -0.07156  -0.11052  -0.11602*  -0.2166***  -0.2342***  -0.1713  -0.19550* 
  [0.54435]  [116.097]  [0.06300]  [0.06180]  [0.06868]  [0.06688]  [0.08105]  [0.07829]  [0.10555]  [0.10114] 
Ratio of female hh. members  -1.1228***  -268.776***  0.02364  0.0276  -0.01855  -0.0148  0.07971  0.10467  0.15949*  0.19392** 
  [0.29550]  [85.2953]  [0.03756]  [0.03763]  [0.04263]  [0.04249]  [0.06724]  [0.06580]  [0.08757]  [0.08501]  
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND REGRESSION MODELS 
First-stage regression  2SLS regression using VHLSS 2004 data  Fixed-effect with IV-2SLS regression using panel data 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  Participation 
in the program 
(Logit) 

































Household size  0.02186  -3.9105  -0.05567***  -0.05675***  -0.06592***  -0.06691***  -0.08444***  -0.08441***  -0.09748***  -0.09744*** 
  [0.04442]  [10.43856]  [0.00422]  [0.00430]  [0.00456]  [0.00469]  [0.00758]  [0.00733]  [0.00986]  [0.00946] 
Ratio of members with lower 
secondary school  -0.30462  -109.579  0.20394***  0.19946***  0.14201***  0.13796***  0.15619***  0.18031***  0.15289**  0.18615*** 
  [0.35523]  [98.018]  [0.03872]  [0.03862]  [0.04511]  [0.04483]  [0.05558]  [0.05379]  [0.07238]  [0.06949] 
Ratio of members with upper 
secondary school  -0.94723*  -199.118*  0.59964***  0.60717***  0.30663***  0.31361***  0.45986***  0.47918***  0.14544  0.1721 
  [0.53967]  [117.468]  [0.05395]  [0.05581]  [0.06176]  [0.06294]  [0.08618]  [0.08333]  [0.11223]  [0.10765] 
Ratio of members with technical 
degree  0.04468  97.20362  0.55934***  0.58286***  0.48470***  0.50617***  0.60099***  0.58462***  0.51800***  0.49543*** 
  [0.68728]  [212.636]  [0.07254]  [0.06753]  [0.08300]  [0.08040]  [0.10498]  [0.10145]  [0.13671]  [0.13106] 
Ratio of members with post 
secondary school  -2.21345  -406.353*  1.1813***  1.1749***  0.9231***  0.9175***  0.8352***  0.8319***  0.63413**  0.62956*** 
  [1.57715]  [227.418]  [0.11716]  [0.11420]  [0.12038]  [0.11717]  [0.18949]  [0.18324]  [0.24676]  [0.23674] 
Number of day-off due to sickness 
per a member  0.00264  1.18215  0.00232***  0.00239***  -0.00182***  -0.00176***         
  [0.00401]  [1.25583]  [0.00053]  [0.00053]  [0.00050]  [0.00048]         
Ratio of hh. members working in 
agriculture  -0.29808  -158.648*  -0.09653**  -0.10670**  -0.01937  -0.0286  -0.13881**  -0.14877**  -0.02907  -0.0428 
  [0.50007]  [88.848]  [0.04899]  [0.04775]  [0.05067]  [0.04924]  [0.06239]  [0.06042]  [0.08124]  [0.07806] 
Ratio of hh. members working in 
service  -0.32236  -98.8255  0.19715***  0.19801***  0.36350***  0.36434***  0.01101  0.00871  0.25646***  0.25330*** 
  [0.51487]  [91.2494]  [0.04968]  [0.04906]  [0.05100]  [0.05057]  [0.06684]  [0.06469]  [0.08704]  [0.08358] 
Ratio of hh. members working in 
industry  -0.40004  -173.700*  0.09758*  0.08752*  0.35232***  0.34321***  0.00278  -0.00658  0.31586***  0.30297*** 
  [0.52256]  [93.134]  [0.05011]  [0.04916]  [0.05325]  [0.05213]  [0.06712]  [0.06516]  [0.08741]  [0.08418] 
Being classified as poor hh. by 
commune authority  1.12824***  315.747***  -0.37879***  -0.39500***  -0.41910***  -0.43406***  -0.13200***  -0.13289***  -0.15574***  -0.15697*** 
  [0.14849]  [63.066]  [0.03029]  [0.03511]  [0.03336]  [0.03791]  [0.02526]  [0.02443]  [0.03289]  [0.03156] 
Area of annual crop land (m2)  -0.00001  -0.00066  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00001*** 
  [0.00001]  [0.00167]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000] 
Area of aquaculture water surface 
(m2)  -0.00004  -0.00132  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00001*  0.00001  0.00002***  0.00002*** 
  [0.00003]  [0.00213]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00001]  [0.00000] 
Area of perennial crop land (m2)  0  0.00079  0.00000**  0.00000**  0.00001**  0.00001**  0  0  0  0  
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DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND REGRESSION MODELS 
First-stage regression  2SLS regression using VHLSS 2004 data  Fixed-effect with IV-2SLS regression using panel data 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLES  Participation 
in the program 
(Logit) 

































  [0.00001]  [0.00273]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000] 
Domestic remittance (thousand VND)  -0.00007***  -0.00753***  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003***  0.00003*** 
  [0.00002]  [0.00229]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000] 
Foreign remittance (thousand VND)  -0.00002  -0.00239*  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00000**  0.00000**  0.00001***  0.00001*** 
  [0.00002]  [0.00127]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000] 
Pension (thousand VND)  -0.00004  -0.00866*  0.00001***  0.00001***  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00002***  0.00004***  0.00004*** 
  [0.00002]  [0.00462]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00000]  [0.00001]  [0.00001] 
Commune variables                     
Costal areas  Omitted                   
                     
Delta  0.32531  33.173  -0.04824*  -0.05253*  -0.07724**  -0.08120**         
  [0.27413]  [50.1917]  [0.02877]  [0.02935]  [0.03253]  [0.03305]         
Midland/hilly land  0.40957  95.916  -0.03633  -0.03118  -0.07964**  -0.07498*         
  [0.32581]  [75.917]  [0.03575]  [0.03543]  [0.04014]  [0.03982]         
Low mountainous areas  0.61908**  175.002**  -0.06274*  -0.05531  -0.06507  -0.05835         
  [0.31068]  [75.747]  [0.03575]  [0.03452]  [0.04086]  [0.03937]         
High mountainous areas  0.74407**  231.347**  -0.0317  -0.02054  -0.03571  -0.0256         
  [0.35545]  [96.639]  [0.04362]  [0.04252]  [0.04698]  [0.04552]         
Red River Delta  Omitted                   
                     
North East  0.61084***  142.554*  0.00946  -0.00931  0.04354  0.02627         
  [0.22582]  [74.173]  [0.03042]  [0.03439]  [0.03370]  [0.03767]         
North West  0.45585  107.497  -0.03475  -0.05001  0.00918  -0.00483         
  [0.29215]  [112.660]  [0.04109]  [0.04213]  [0.04390]  [0.04544]         
North Central Coast  0.32336  74.216  -0.08148***  -0.08376***  -0.13627***  -0.13838***         
  [0.22079]  [61.019]  [0.02339]  [0.02357]  [0.02654]  [0.02685]         
South Central Coast  0.48669**  167.516**  0.00503  0.01324  -0.01224  -0.00479         
  [0.22221]  [65.706]  [0.02764]  [0.02658]  [0.02925]  [0.02822]         
Central Highlands  -0.44008  -97.331  0.08472**  0.08974**  0.19328***  0.19791***         
  [0.35200]  [105.367]  [0.04230]  [0.04167]  [0.04481]  [0.04489]         
North East South  -0.54642*  -64.192  0.31966***  0.32573***  0.34068***  0.34627***         
  [0.30503]  [61.926]  [0.02930]  [0.02928]  [0.03382]  [0.03363]          
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Mekong River Delta  -0.51325**  -46.723  0.21762***  0.22605***  0.26731***  0.27505***         
  [0.23105]  [51.151]  [0.02399]  [0.02468]  [0.02658]  [0.02740]         
Have post-office  0.38880**  72.262*  -0.02148  -0.02309  -0.0032  -0.00472         
  [0.16797]  [37.417]  [0.01804]  [0.01802]  [0.01984]  [0.01979]         
Have inter-communal market  0.08498  30.943  -0.01879  -0.01904  -0.02554  -0.02579         
  [0.12503]  [33.622]  [0.01375]  [0.01395]  [0.01583]  [0.01590]         
Have non-farm enterprises  -0.12189  -28.605  0.03244**  0.03426***  0.01738  0.01905  0.01437  0.02045  0.02102  0.02941 
  [0.12011]  [33.331]  [0.01317]  [0.01322]  [0.01497]  [0.01506]  [0.01581]  [0.01478]  [0.02059]  [0.01909] 
Have irrigation plant  0.15559  30.107  -0.02406*  -0.02608*  -0.01564  -0.01749         
  [0.12801]  [32.297]  [0.01445]  [0.01453]  [0.01626]  [0.01632]         
Distance to nearest agriculture 
extension center  -0.00206  -2.121  0.00131  0.00119  0.00236**  0.00225**  0.00306***  0.00329***  0.00497***  0.00529*** 
  [0.00592]  [1.688]  [0.00099]  [0.00099]  [0.00093]  [0.00091]  [0.00090]  [0.00087]  [0.00117]  [0.00112] 
Have national electricity network  -0.03421  -91.508  0.01348  -0.00902  0.0192  -0.00137  0.05796*  0.05125  -0.00288  -0.01213 
  [0.33153]  [162.899]  [0.03977]  [0.03290]  [0.04949]  [0.04491]  [0.03451]  [0.03372]  [0.04494]  [0.04357] 
Have primary school  1.81382  489.822***  -0.1893  -0.18811  -0.22999  -0.22911         
  [1.15382]  [163.326]  [0.13861]  [0.14540]  [0.18380]  [0.18732]         
Have lower secondary school  -0.31606  -81.818  -0.01578  -0.01617  0.01711  0.0168         
  [0.23977]  [79.154]  [0.02923]  [0.02891]  [0.03516]  [0.03528]         
Have upper secondary school  -0.16901  -35.951  0.04023**  0.04008**  0.04820**  0.04806**         
  [0.16951]  [40.745]  [0.01794]  [0.01803]  [0.01957]  [0.01958]         
With employment generation program  -0.13024  -15.927  -0.01624  -0.01312  -0.01103  -0.00817  -0.00502  -0.00947  -0.00674  -0.01288 
  [0.14344]  [38.535]  [0.01530]  [0.01509]  [0.01701]  [0.01686]  [0.01546]  [0.01470]  [0.02014]  [0.01899] 
With poverty reduction program  0.12268  14.021  0.00488  0.00029  -0.00398  -0.00819  -0.07296***  -0.07070***  -0.05674***  -0.05362*** 
  [0.11932]  [33.816]  [0.01444]  [0.01462]  [0.01598]  [0.01613]  [0.01374]  [0.01336]  [0.01789]  [0.01726] 
With program on socioeconomic 
development and infrastructure  -0.03154  11.791  -0.02117  -0.0184  -0.02472  -0.02218  0.04493***  0.04527***  0.05160***  0.05208*** 
  [0.12644]  [32.867]  [0.01430]  [0.01420]  [0.01593]  [0.01581]  [0.01355]  [0.01311]  [0.01765]  [0.01693] 
With education and culture program  -0.19651  -59.177*  -0.0023  -0.0045  -0.02554  -0.02752  -0.02677*  -0.02919**  -0.00338  -0.00672 
  [0.12699]  [33.786]  [0.01544]  [0.01514]  [0.01703]  [0.01682]  [0.01419]  [0.01374]  [0.01848]  [0.01776] 
With public health program  0.23785*  59.404  0.00484  0.00283  -0.01535  -0.01722  -0.00504  -0.00311  -0.03252  -0.02985 
  [0.14268]  [43.113]  [0.01779]  [0.01825]  [0.02012]  [0.02051]  [0.01561]  [0.01511]  [0.02033]  [0.01952] 
With environment and clean water  0.12684  60.184  -0.00392  0.00006  -0.0145  -0.01088  -0.03975**  -0.03627**  -0.02945  -0.02466  
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  [0.14921]  [44.396]  [0.01818]  [0.01784]  [0.02044]  [0.02011]  [0.01773]  [0.01712]  [0.02309]  [0.02212] 
With the program 135 that supports 
communes with difficulties  -0.11809  -28.616  0.03624  0.03559  0.03022  0.0296  0.03241  0.02917  -0.00655  -0.01102 
  [0.17180]  [49.871]  [0.02369]  [0.02359]  [0.02186]  [0.02156]  [0.03573]  [0.03459]  [0.04653]  [0.04469] 
Village variables                     
have car road roads for cars?  -0.42724**  -118.248**  0.06698***  0.06399***  0.06169**  0.05901**  -0.02955  -0.02482  0.01491  0.02143 
  [0.18084]  [51.770]  [0.02202]  [0.02127]  [0.02400]  [0.02304]  [0.02570]  [0.02493]  [0.03347]  [0.03221] 
Distance to nearest town (km)  0.00454  0.2199  -0.00076  -0.00106  -0.00210**  -0.00237**  0.00215**  0.00180*  0.00126  0.00078 
  [0.00775]  [2.366]  [0.00094]  [0.00092]  [0.00104]  [0.00099]  [0.00103]  [0.00100]  [0.00134]  [0.00129] 
Distance to Commune People 
Committee (km)  0.0174  7.021  0.00187  0.00246  -0.00004  0.00049  0.00182  0.00128  0.00421  0.00346 
  [0.02756]  [7.9442]  [0.00314]  [0.00313]  [0.00368]  [0.00367]  [0.00362]  [0.00353]  [0.00472]  [0.00456] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km)  0.01383*  3.7630  -0.00188*  -0.00228*  -0.00257**  -0.00295**  -0.00142  -0.00085  -0.00011  0.00066 
  [0.00776]  [3.171]  [0.00110]  [0.00117]  [0.00125]  [0.00133]  [0.00148]  [0.00142]  [0.00193]  [0.00184] 
Distance to nearest periodic market 
(km)  0.00718  3.321  -0.00215*  -0.002  -0.00319**  -0.00305**  -0.00371***  -0.00379***  -0.00376**  -0.00387** 
  [0.01077]  [3.689]  [0.00127]  [0.00126]  [0.00142]  [0.00139]  [0.00125]  [0.00121]  [0.00163]  [0.00156] 
Distance to nearest whole-sale 
market (km)  -0.00636  -1.401  0.00039  0.00046  0.00115*  0.00121*         
  [0.00454]  [1.129]  [0.00054]  [0.00055]  [0.00063]  [0.00064]         
Distance to nearest primary school 
(km)  -0.01493  -2.9819  -0.00009  -0.00023  0.00586  0.00573  0.00588  0.00461  0.01169*  0.00993 
  [0.05179]  [15.801]  [0.00638]  [0.00646]  [0.00648]  [0.00654]  [0.00518]  [0.00507]  [0.00675]  [0.00656] 
Distance to nearest lower secondary 
school (km)  -0.02695  -11.796  0.00112  0.00019  -0.00095  -0.00178  -0.00235  -0.00316  -0.00533  -0.00644* 
  [0.02553]  [7.7462]  [0.00313]  [0.00304]  [0.00343]  [0.00330]  [0.00271]  [0.00260]  [0.00353]  [0.00336] 
Distance to nearest upper secondary 
school (km)  0.01702**  7.6567**  -0.0018  -0.00141  -0.00013  0.00023  0.00403***  0.00443***  0.00324*  0.00380** 
  [0.00746]  [3.2317]  [0.00122]  [0.00115]  [0.00132]  [0.00126]  [0.00131]  [0.00126]  [0.00171]  [0.00163] 
Distance to nearest regional health 
polyclinic (km)  -0.0026  -1.569  -0.00056  -0.00068  0.00014  0.00003  0.00056  0.00047  0.00192**  0.00179** 
  [0.00398]  [1.2309]  [0.00044]  [0.00043]  [0.00049]  [0.00048]  [0.00061]  [0.00058]  [0.00079]  [0.00076] 
Distance to nearest district hospital 
(km)  -0.00127  0.1692  0.00025  0.00023  -0.00011  -0.00012  -0.00250**  -0.00268**  -0.00236  -0.00262*  
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  [0.00667]  [2.0642]  [0.00080]  [0.00080]  [0.00086]  [0.00086]  [0.00111]  [0.00106]  [0.00144]  [0.00137] 
Distance to nearest other hospital 
(km)  0.0008  0.2979  -0.00001  0.00001  0  0.00002  0.00041***  0.00040***  0.00038***  0.00037*** 
  [0.00076]  [0.2433]  [0.00009]  [0.00009]  [0.00011]  [0.00010]  [0.00009]  [0.00009]  [0.00012]  [0.00012] 
Poverty ratio by commune authority 
(instrumental variable) 
-0.03567***  -11.740***                 
  [0.00952]  [2.481]                 
Distance to nearest bank (km) 
(instrumental variable)  -4.41956***  -948.248***                 
  [0.92742]  [213.722]                 
Constant  -3.07500**  230.451  8.16279***  8.18328***  8.46117***  8.47992***  8.09135***  8.05034***  8.20999***  8.15344*** 
  [1.37008]  [248.688]  [0.15843]  [0.16378]  [0.20518]  [0.20753]  [0.13473]  [0.12982]  [0.17544]  [0.16772] 
R-squared    0.05                 
Pseudo R-squared  0.12                   
Observations  6440  6440  6440  6440  6439  6439  5552  5552  5552  5552 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 




Table A.3: Tests on weak instruments and over-identification of IV and endogeneity of the 
VBSP credit in IV regressions  
  Expenditure equation  Income equation 
Overidentification of IV: Hansen J 
statistic 
) 1 ( χ = 0.10 
P-value = 0.76 
) 1 ( χ = 0.11 
P-value = 0.74 
     
Test of endogeneity of “Size of credit 
from the VBSP program”: Durbin-Wu-
Hausman statistic 
) 1 ( χ = 8.21 
P-value = 0.004 
) 1 ( χ = 6.47 
P-value = 0.01 
     
Test of endogeneity of “Participation in 
the VBSP program”: Durbin-Wu-
Hausman statistic 
) 1 ( χ = 8.80 
P-value = 0.003 
) 1 ( χ = 6.97 
P-value = 0.01 
     
Weak IV identification test: Cragg-Donald 
F statistic  24.74  29.99 
Table  A.4:  Estimates  of  coefficients  of  interaction  between  the  program  variables  and 
poverty status in 2002.  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES AND IV ESTIMATORS 
Log of expenditure per capita  Log of expenditure per capita  PROGRAM VARIABLES 
2SLS  GMM  LIML  2SLS  GMM  LIML 
Program variable is credit size              
Credit size  0.00012  0.00012  0.00022  0.00009  0.00013  0.00103 
  [0.00014]  [0.00013]  [0.00028]  [0.00017]  [0.00017]  [0.00360] 
Credit size * Poor 2002   -0.00002  -0.00003  -0.00013  -0.00004  -0.0001  -0.00121 
  [0.00017]  [0.00017]  [0.00035]  [0.00022]  [0.00022]  [0.00454] 
Poor in 2002  -0.2666***  -0.2621***  -0.2320**  -0.2410***  -0.2234***  0.1197 
  [0.05335]  [0.05325]  [0.10587]  [0.07091]  [0.07017]  [1.39133] 
Program variable is dummy participation one           
Program participation  0.59584  0.54332  1.44121  0.4826  0.64185  7.01572 
  [0.66538]  [0.66388]  [2.05087]  [0.83109]  [0.82637]  [34.44045] 
Program participation * Poor 2002   -0.21042  -0.21851  -1.15803  -0.27831  -0.52579  -7.8011 
  [0.76496]  [0.76450]  [2.35550]  [0.98643]  [0.97672]  [39.79735] 
Poor 2002  -0.25566***  -0.25446***  -0.17212  -0.23018**  -0.20901**  0.43364 
  [0.06801]  [0.06796]  [0.20618]  [0.08960]  [0.08883]  [3.50167] 
Number of observations  5552  5552  5552  5552  5552  5552 
Figures in brackets are standard errors (Standards errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster 
correlation).  
5552 is the total number of observations in panel data VHLSS 2002-2004. The number of households in the 
panel data is 2772. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2002 and VHLSS 2004 